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SPECIAL FEATURES

Nationalization and International
Law: Testimony of
Elihu Lauterpacht, Q.C.
FOREWORD
Some months ago in Washington Dave Gill and I had the opportunity to
discuss nationalization and pursuit litigation with Eli Lauterpacht. In the
course of the conversation he kindly offered to send us the transcript of his
testimony as an Expert Witness in the Huni case in Texas. The transcript
proved interesting far beyond the question of nationalization. I sought and
received permission to publish it.
What follows is a corrected and slightly edited version of the transcript of
the testimony given by Elihu Lauterpacht, Q.C.

F.S.R.

98

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION
VALERO ENERGY CORPORATION AND
COASTAL STATES MARKETING, INC.,

)
)

Plaintiffs,
V.

)
)
)

NELSON BUNKER HUNT,
HERBERT HUNT AND
LAMAR HUNT,

)
)
)

)

)

Defendants.

VOLUME VI
March 6, 1981

)

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 74-H-1422
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PROCEEDINGS
The following proceedings were had within the presence and the hearing of
the jury.
THE COURT: Very well, the jury is in the box.
As I understand it, there is going to be a presentation of defense evidence
at this point. Who will speak for the defense?
MR. REASONER: That is correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Mr. Reasoner. And there will be two witnesses?

MR. REASONER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Now, then, I don't know that I have theMR. REASONER: They are on our witness list, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I see them. All right, as I understand it, Mr. Elihu
Lauterpacht?
MR. REASONER: Yes, Your Honor.

And Mr. Lamar Hunt?
MR. REASONER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, for reasons that counsel
have agreed upon and because of scheduling problems of certain of these
out-of-town and, in one case, out-of-the-country witnesses, we are going to
present evidence at this point from the defense, and you will hear two witnesses today which the defense would normally present upon the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case, so I want you to bear that in ntind as this
evidence proceeds.
All right, call your next witness, please.
MR. REASONER:

Thank you, Your Honor. The defendants would call

Mr. Elihu Lauterpacht, Q.C., Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Come forward and be sworn, please.

Witness sworn.
Elihu Lauterpacht,Q. C called as a witness in behafof the defendants, having been duly sworn, test!fied asfollows.
Direct Examination by Mr. Reasoner
Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, would you state your name for the record, please?
A: Elihu Lauterpacht.
Q: Would you tell the jury just briefly what your educational background
is, please, sir?
A: I went to school first in England, then I had the privilege of coming to
school in the United States for three years. After that I went back to
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England, went to college in Cambridge, took a degree in law there and
subsequently was called to the bar.

Q: Let me ask you this, Mr. Lauterpacht, and I may do it from time to
time: When you say called to the bar, does that mean, in American
terms, that you became a lawyer?
A: Yes, I became a barrister. In England we have a divided profession.
There are barristers and there are solicitors. Barristers deal with court
work and heavy advising, while solicitors have a closer contact with the
client.
I am a barrister.
Q: As a barrister, have you specialized in any particular area of the law,
Mr. Lauterpacht?
A: I have, all my working life, been an international lawyer. As an international lawyer I have practiced at the bar and I have also been a teacher
of the law.
Q: Would you tell the jury a little, please, about what you mean by the
term international law?
A: In the legal system of the world we distinguish between the laws of particular countries and the laws which govern the relations between particular countries. The laws of a particular country, say the United
States, we call national or domestic law. The law which governs the
relations between countries, say between the United States and Mexico
or the United States and Great Britain, we call international law.
That governs relations between states. It also has a direct bearing on
the position of a citizen of one country in the territory of another.
Q: You mentioned teaching also. Would you tell us a little about your
teaching, Mr. Lauterpacht?
A: Shortly after I graduated and became a lawyer I went to the bar, which
meant that I practiced from an office in London. And at the same time,
I began to do some part-time teaching in my old University, Cambridge.
And then there came a moment at which I accepted a position to
lecture in international law in Cambridge. I became a Fellow of Trinity
College, which is one of the colleges within the University of Cambridge. That was in 1953.
From that date to the present I have taught law in Cambridge, always
specializing in international law.
Q: In your fellowship in international law have you authored or edited any
legal work?
A: The two most substantial works with which I have been associated in
my academic career have been the following: First I have edited, now
for twenty-one years, the periodical called The International Law
Reports. This is a series of volumes, of which several appear each year,
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which contain the decisions of international courts, that is to say, courts
created by states to decide problems arising between them, and decisions of national courts when those national courts touch on questions
of international law.
For example, in due course the decision of this Court, touching, as it
probably will, on points of international law, will be the sort of report
that we will put into the InternationalLaw Reports.
My second major publication-and, indeed, I created it, was something called British Practice in InternationalLaw. One of the main elements in identifying the content of law between the states is what states
actually do. And so it is important to identify that practice. And in
various countries there are people whose concern it is to collect that
practice and publish it.
For example, the United States has a publication called Digest of
United States Practice in InternationalLaw. That was established, following the tradition which I had myself started, of researching the current British practice in international law.
Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, let me ask you, you also spoke of what I think we
could call here a private practice as a barrister, where you represented
people in the international area. Would you give us a brief description
of your experience in that area, please, sir?
A: At the same time as I did my teaching in Cambridge, I also held myself
out to practice in this specialized field. This is possible because international law is not the kind of law which is applied daily in the courts, like
this. And so one didn't have a conflict of obligations between daily
appearances in court and the need to be available for lectures.
So what I have been doing is to practice as well as teach. This practice takes a variety of forms. Sometimes I advise governments, governments of foreign countries who have problems with international law on
which they find it convenient to seek advice from a specialist like
myself. And over the years I have advised at least a score of
governments.
Indeed, for one period of three years, in the years 1975, 1976 and
1977, I actually went to Australia and became the Legal Adviser of the
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs. In that position I had the
rank equivalent to the head of a department of government, and I often
went abroad on missions for the Australians. I was deputy leader of the
Australian delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations
for three years. I was also the deputy leader of their delegation to the
Law of the Sea Conference, which is a conference that is meeting for the
purpose of trying to draw up new rules relating to the law of the sea. So
for three years I worked exclusively for one government.
In addition to working for governments I have as clients large corporations that conduct international business, many of them, but not all of
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them, oil companies which have problems between themselves and the

government in whose territory they operate.
Q: Excuse me. Mr. Lauterpacht, we have retained you as an expert witness
in this matter, have we not?

A: That is my understanding.
May I just complete the identification of my practical or professional
qualifications, unless you wish to come back to them later?
Q: No, that would be fine. Excuse me.
A: Apart from counseling, I have also appeared on many occasions as
counsel in international tribunals when states are having cases one
against the other. In addition, I also do a certain amount of international judicial work. I am a member of the World Bank Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, and also a member of the World
Bank Administrative Tribunal. I was, for a period, the chairman of the
East African Common Market Tribunal, and I have, on occasion, been
an arbitrator in specific cases.
Q: Thank you. Have you appeared before any courts of the United States
as an expert witness, Mr. Lauterpacht?
A: Yes, I have, on one occasion. Two years ago I appeared on behalf of the
government of the United States in litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court
between the U~ited States and California.
Q: Would you tell us briefly what the nature of that case was?
A: Over the years there has been litigation between the U.S. government
and a number of the states of the United States regarding the rights of
the federal government and of the states in the offshore area. This litigation has given rise to some technical questions as to what are the
proper limits of state and federal jurisdiction. And these limits have
been determined in accordance with international law, which is why I
was brought in to give evidence on this occasion.
This particular case was known as the Fourth Supplemental Petition
in the case between the United States and California which began more
than a score of years ago. The particular question was whether, when
you are trying to measure the seaward boundary of the state of California, you take into consideration the numerous piers that have been constructed along the Californian coast. Do you measure from the seaward
end of the pier or the landward end of the pier?
This may seem to you a very minor question, but interestingly
enough, it makes a difference of 1200 acres of oil-bearing submerged
area, to one side or the other. And that is why it was a necessary subject
of litigation.
Q: All right, sir.
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Mr. Lauterpacht, in the past have you represented the companies
whose assets have been expropriated?
A: Yes, I have.
Q: Would you tell us, just outline for us briefly, the situations you have
been involved in, in the past, for companies whose assets were expropriated by a foreign government?
MR. MATTHEWS: Your Honor, excuse me, that seems to be quite an
open-ended question allowing Mr. Lauterpacht to say basically what he
wants to.
I would ask the Court to instruct counsel to proceed by question and
answer, rather than by a question which calls for a narrative on the part of
the witness.
THE COURT: I think, Mr. Matthews, it's preliminary. I'll hear it.
MR. REASONER: Thank you, Your Honor.
Q: If you would just enumerate briefly the instances where you have been
involved, Mr. Lauterpacht, or those that you immediately recall?
A: Well, over the years I have been involved in quite a number of these
episodes.
As you realize, from what I have said to you earlier, my involvement
in international law goes back now thirty years.
The first specific episode in which I was engaged was the nationalization in 1951 of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran. The AngloIranian Oil Company is now called BP, one of the major oil companies
in the world.
In those days it had concession rights in Iran. Then in 1951, under
Dr. Mossadek, the Iranian government nationalized the Anglo-Iranian
concession.
As a result, there was an attempt to go to arbitration, which was
unsuccessful for reasons beyond the control of Anglo-Iranian. Also,
Anglo-Iranian started proceedings in various domestic courts to try and
enforce its rights to the oil that was exported from Iran.
That was the first major episode in which I was involved, and perhaps
in due course I shall have an opportunity to explain to you more fully
the nature of the issues involved in that.
Then I was involved, in 1956, in problems which arose out of the
nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by Egypt.
The problems there were a bit different from the problems in Iran in
1951, because in the case of the Suez Canal there was no specific commodity, like oil, which the Egyptians could sell. What the Egyptians
took away from the Canal Company was the Canal Company's right to
run the canal and to collect money for doing so. But it gave rise to
comparable problems.
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Also, in the aftermath of the Suez episode, the Egyptian government
nationalized or expropriated the properties of some foreign mining companies and I was involved in giving advice to them as to how to deal
with the situation.
I have been involved in a number of comparable situations. For
example, in 1972 the Iraq government terminated the concession it had
given to the Iraq Petroleum Company, which is a company owned by a
number of major oil companies, and we had similar problems there.
And then, again, when British Petroleum Company was nationalized
in Libya in 1971, I was involved in the matters relating to that.
Q: Let me, and I don't want to--I realize, Mr. Lauterpacht, it wouldn't be
appropriate for me to ask you about specific advice you have given to
clients in the past, but can you tell us generally the advice given and the
actions pursued by companies whose assets were expropriated, in your
judgment, illegally?
MR. MATTHEWS: Your Honor, I object to that question, it's totally irrelevant what advice he has given to other clients.
THE COURT: I think it's appropriate for him to testify as to his expertise
in the area. I think he has done that. Now I think you should focus on the
issues in the case, Mr. Reasoner.
MR. REASONER: All right, Your Honor.

Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, you mentioned that you were retained by the British
Petroleum to act for them with regard to the Libyan confiscation of its
half interest in Concession No. 65 in Libya, is that correct?
A: I was.
Q: Did you have a view as to the legality of the Libyan expropriation of the
British Petroleum half interest in Concession No. 65?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: Would you please tell the jury what that view was and what the basis
for it was?
A: I am now addressing myself only to the question of whether what the
Libyan government did to the British Petroleum Company was lawful.
The relationship between the British Petroleum Company and the
Libyan governmentMATTHEWS: Excuse me, a minute, Mr. Lauterpacht.
Your Honor, I object to this testimony if it is being offered to attempt to
convince the Court and jury that the Libyan nationalization was unlawful
or invalid.
If it's being offered simply to show his state of mind, to set a scene for
advice he gave his client, I would ask that the Court so instruct the jury.
THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection.

MR.
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You may proceed.
MR. REASONER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

A: Naturally, in trying to assist you, I don't want to become overcomplicated. But it's a necessary part of the explanation of what British Petroleum subsequently did to tell you why it is that I took the view that the
Libyan action was unlawful.
Basically it's quite simple: the Libyans had an agreement with British Petroleum which had a certain period to run and was not expired.
That agreement said that it could not be changed by unilateral Libyan
action.
The Libyans took unilateral action. That action was a political reaction to something that the British government, the Libyans thought, had
done. The Libyans objected to British policy in the Persian Gulf. And
so, by way of reaction, they said, "We are going to strike at Britain, we
are going to take away the rights of British Petroleum in Libya." And
they took away those rights without paying compensation.
The accumulation of those factors, the discriminatory factor, the element of political retaliation, the failure to assure the payment of
prompt, adequate and effective compensation, all those things added up
to make what the Libyans did unlawful, both under the concession and
under international law.
That is my answer to the question put to me: how did I assess the
legality of the Libyan action.
Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, do you know what view the British government took
with regard to the expropriation of BP's interest by Libya?
A: The British government took the view that the expropriation was contrary to international law and invalid.
MR.

Your Honor, may I approach the witness?
Yes, sir.

REASONER:

THE COURT:

Q: Let me ask you, Mr. Lauterpacht, to examine the document which has
been admitted into evidence as a defendants' exhibit, No. 86, and ask
you if that is a note from the British government protesting the legality
of the action?
A: Yes, this is the note of the British government of 23 December, 1971,
addressed to the Libyan Arab Republic, and protesting that this act of
nationalization was contrary to international law and is invalid.
Q: Let me ask you, Mr. Lauterpacht, if you would read to the jury, please,
the third and fourth paragraphs of that note?
A: There are two opening paragraphs to the note which I do not read, and
then the text continues as follows:
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"An act of nationalization is not legitimate in international law unless
it satisfies the following requirements:
"(1) It must be for a public purpose related to the internal needs of
the taking State; and
"(2) It must be followed by the payment of prompt, adequate and
effective compensation.
"Nationalization measures which are arbitrary or discriminatory or
which are motivated by considerations of a political character unrelated
to the internal well being of the taking State are, by reference to those
principles, illegal and invalid."
Q: Thank you, Mr. Lauterpacht.
Mr. Lauterpacht, at the time of the nationalization did British Petroleum publish notices to the world stating its position with regard to the
nationalization?
A: Yes, it did.
Q: Do you recognize that, Mr. Lauterpacht, as an announcement published
by British Petroleum Company with regard to the expropriation of its
assets by Libya?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, in your judgment as an international lawyer, is that a
proper and necessary notice for British Petroleum to give?
MR. MATTHEWS: Excuse me, Your Honor. I think that goes far beyond
proof of the state of mind of the British Petroleum Company.
I have no objection to him asking what advice he gave to his client, but to
get him to testify that that was proper, was a proper thing to do, seems to
invade the province of this Court and jury.
MR. REASONER: I'll rephrase the question, if you would like, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, did you advise British Petroleum that that was a
proper and necessary notice to be given in that situation?
A: Yes, I did, both that it was proper and that it was necessary.
Q: Thank you, Mr. Lauterpacht.
Now, why is it necessary to give such notices when you believe that
your assets have been illegally expropriated?
A: This explanation will take a moment or two, and it's quite an important
one.
When a company like British Petroleum is expropriated in a foreign
country and its rights to produce oil are taken away from it, or
attempted to be taken away from it, by the host government, naturally
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the company must defend its rights in every way it can. There are, theoretically, a number of opportunities to do so.
One theoretical possibility, but only a theoretical one, is that the British government, the government of the state of which British Petroleum
is a national, may take up the claim in an international court on an
international level against the state which has done the wrong to the
company. That is only theoretical, because the exercise of jurisdiction
by an international court, the ability of the court to hear and decide the
case, depends upon the consent of the defendant. In that respect it's
quite different from a court in the United States, where everybody is
bound to appear in the court, if sued, and put up their defense, which
may be good or bad. But on the international scene a state cannot be
taken to a court if it does not consent.
Now, in these expropriation cases, and in particular in this case of
Libya, Libya did not give its consent to the jurisdiction of an interna-.
tional court, and so that remedy couldn't be pursued.
So then we had to turn to the second remedy.
In the agreement by which Libya allowed British Petroleum to operate there, there was an arbitration clause. This was a provision that said
if any dispute arises between BP and the Libyan government, then it
shall go to arbitration if either party wishes.
And so BP did start arbitration proceedings against Libya.
At the same time, there was a third opportunity for reaction. The
Libyans were going to sell oil from the area in which British Petroleum
had its rights. British Petroleum took the view, very understandably,
that it still had the right to extract that oil and that, therefore, any oil
that was extracted became its property.
And so it wanted to be able to assert its rights of property against
anybody who bought that oil, just as you or I would if we had something taken from us and we could identify it. We would want to go to
the person who had it and say, "I would like to have that object back."
To take a home-made example, supposing somebody took my watch
and I saw that watch in a shop window, of a pawnbroker. I would want
to go in to that pawnbroker and say, "Look, you've got my watch and I
would like to have it back. If you don't give it back to me, I'm going to
sue you."
And that was exactly the attitude of British Petroleum. They wanted
to be able to say to people who bought that oil, "Look, that's our oil and
we want to sue you."
But then we come to a slightly technical point of law, and that is, in
some countries if a person buys something innocently, without knowing
this is the subject of a dispute as to title, and if they pay the fair value
for that something, then they get a good title to it, notwithstanding the
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fact that it was stolen, or that the person who sold it to them did not
have the right to sell it to them.
Now, in order to anticipate that problem and to let all potential purchasers of oil know that the oil that Libya was about to trade in, taken
from the area of British Petroleum's concession, was, in the view of British Petroleum, in effect, stolen oil, British Petroleum put out this advertisement. This is a notice that was put in the papers, the principal
papers of the world, so as to let potential purchasers know that there
was a problem about this oil, that they were about to buy what in the
trade was called hot oil.
And that's important for the ptrpose of anticipating and putting an
end to any argument about the innocence of the prospective buyer.
Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, is suing people who buy illegally expropriated goods
called pursuit litigation?
A: It is. In some courts it is called pursuit litigation.
Q: In the sense that you are pursuing the goods that you claim were illegally expropriated?
A: Precisely that. You say that's mine and that's mine, I want them back.

Q: Has that become a standard practice for companies whose assets are
illegally expropriated and who are seeking to defend their rights?
MR. MATTHEWS: Objection, Your Honor, I don't think whether that has
become a standard practice is relevant to this lawsuit. What this witness
needs to concentrate on, it seems to me, is the advice he gave his clients and
his reasons for giving that advice.

May I respond, Your Honor?
I think he is in the realm of that area that you have

MR. REASONER:
THE COURT:

described, Mr. Matthews, I'm going to permit it. I'll overrule the objection.
You may answer it.
MR. REASONER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

A: The question put to me was whether this kind of pursuit litigation is a
standard or common practice. And the answer is yes. And the fact that
the answer is yes is, of course, very relevant to the question of the advice
which was given to British Petroleum in 1971 by persons like myself.
I ought to explain how far back this kind of practice goes. I told you
a little while ago that I had been involved in the consequences of the
nationalization of Anglo-Iranian in 1951. That was when I was a very
young man and I had just come to the bar. I remember it very vividly,
and if I might just tell you the story in personal terms, because it
explains my whole approach to this subject, my very strong feelings
about the basis of principle on which this kind of action rests.
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Now, my father happened to be an international lawyer, also. He was
more academic than I have been, he was almost exclusively academic,
but he was occasionally involved in practical matters. He was a lawyer
of some distinction, and Anglo-Iranian came to him in 1951 and asked
him, "What should we do about oil which is being sold by Iran? How
do we recover it?"
And he happened to see me in the Law Courts and showed me, as we
call them, the instructions, the request from Anglo-Iranian for advice.
He said, "What do you think about it?"
I said, with my sort of student knowledge, "That's dead easy, there is
no prospect of recovery. We have certain cases in England which say
very clearly that when a state takes property which is located within that
state, and takes it in accordance with its own law, and then sells that
property to somebody who carries it out of the state, to England, and
when the former owner challenges the title in England, the English cases
say that the former owner cannot recover because the state acquired
good title in accordance with the law where the property was when it
was taken. That's a rather technical rule of law."
And I said to my father, "That must be the answer."
And he said, "Well, it probably is so."
Then I went off to court, to sit behind my master in the law, I was still
serving my apprenticeship in those days, in a very dull case on which I
could not concentrate. And I sat there thinking, and I said to myself,
"This seems ridiculous. Here the Iranians have taken oil from AngloIranian in violation of international law, a basic illegality. And yet here
am I, saying that international law, that very same body of law which
they have broken, that international law should protect them in the consequences of their wrongdoing."
And I said to myself, "That must be a legal nonsense."
The more I thought about it, the more of a nonsense it seemed to be,
and the more I realized that my original answer was wrong.
So when I came out of court I went to research it. And I found that
there were authorities to show that where the acts of the foreign state in
taking the property of a non-citizen violated international law, in that
exceptional case the courts of England, and the courts of some other
states, too, would not treat that taking as valid and they would, therefore, restore to the former owner its property when it came under their
jurisdiction.
And so I went away, researched it, wrote it up. I persuaded my father
and he, in his turn, gave advice to Anglo-Iranian and Anglo-Iranian, in
1951, issued comparable advertisements to these. People were told that
if they bought oil from Iran in those days, taken from the area of the
Anglo-Iranian concession, Anglo-Iranian would sue to recover it.
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And in due course Anglo-Iranian did sue to recover that oil and they
succeeded in one court and they failed in two courts. They succeeded in
a court in Aden, which was then a British Colony, and they failed in the
Italian court and in the Japanese court.
Now, I won't, for the moment, go into the reasons why they failed.
The point is, they succeeded in one court. And the principle which I
have just explained to you, that you don't recognize the consequences of
an international unlawful act, was stated by that court.
That has been a fundamental part of my thinking ever since, because
I believe it to be entirely in accordance with legal principle. And so
whenever cases like that have arisen subsequently I have advised in similar terms, and similar actions have been taken.
Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, did you consider pursuit litigation to be justified in the
case of BP's expropriation by Libya and recommend it?
A: Certainly. For exactly the same reasons that I just explained to you in
relation to the 1951 episode: the taking by Libya was internationally
unlawful. The British government shared that view, as I have just read
out to you in the text of the British note. So I took the view that because
it was internationally unlawful, the Libyan action was, in law, ineffective to deprive British Petroleum of the basis on which it acquired title
to oil in Libya. Therefore, any oil produced in Libya from the British
Petroleum area belonged to British Petroleum and British Petroleum
could pursue that oil into the various countries into which it might be

carried.
Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, in giving them the general advice that it was proper to
institute pursuit litigation, did you also advise them on the propriety of
instituting it in each particular country where they found it necessary to
bring suit, or did they retain other counsel in those countries?
A: It is important, in answering that question, that I should explain to you
the limits within which, as a British lawyer, I can advise.
According to our professional understanding in England, a lawyer
who is qualified in English law is capable only of advising on English
law. So basically I can only advise on English law.
However, at the same time, I have made myself expert in international law, which is a body of law outside English law, but not within
any other country's legal system. And so it is perfectly proper for me to
give advice on international law.
What I cannot do, and never do, is to pretend that I can advise, in a
technically satisfactory manner, on the law of any foreign state. I may
have some ideas of what the law is, but those are, if I may put it this
way, academic ideas, they are not ideas which, as a professional, I am
entitled to speak to, convey or sell to my clients. I cannot take professional responsibility for advising about a system of foreign law.
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The result is that when, in pursuit litigation of this kind, the question
arises, shall we proceed in Italy, or France, or Brazil, or wherever we
know a cargo of oil is going, it is understood that we must seek advice
from Italian, French or Brazilian lawyers, who then take professional
responsibility for advising on the prospect of recovery in that country,
and on the mechanics of going about it.
My advice is limited to assisting the company in laying down, if you
will, the general strategy, the basic underlying rules of international law
which have to be invoked within each country, if the case is to be got
going.
Q: I don't want to dwell too long on this topic, but let me just ask you
briefly, to your knowledge did British Petroleum retain counsel in each
country where it filed suit to advise it on the propriety of an action in
that country?
A: Yes.
Q: Did they retain such counsel in the United States?
A: Indeed. I mean, in the United States, for example, British Petroleum
went to one of the most important and prominent law firms in New
York, Sullivan and Cromwell. They are a very ancient firm. They must
be, I think, a century old now, a firm of which, for example, John Foster
Dulles was a partner when he was in active law practice. It's a firm of
undoubted distinction. And they assumed responsibility for the conduct
of British Petroleum's litigation in the United States.
Q: Did they retain counsel in Italy?
A: Yes, they did. In Italy, I remember we went to a consultation in Rome
with a leading Italian advocate, Mr. Chiomenti, and at that meeting
there was the leading Italian international lawyer, Professor Ago, and
discussed the matter there.
Q: What is Professor Ago's present position, if you know?
A: Professor Ago's distinction at that time was as the leading Italian professor of international law. He was also then a member of the International Law Commission, which is the United Nations body that deals
with the codification of international law. And now he is a judge of the
International Court of Justice.
Q: Now, you referred earlier to British Petroleum's attempt to arbitrate
with the Libyans. Did the Libyans participate in that arbitration?
A: No, they did not. They took no step whatsoever in the arbitration.
Q: Was an arbitrator appointed?
A: Yes. Under the arbitration clause in the contract between BP and
Libya, there was a provision that if one side or the other did not cooperate in establishing the arbitral tribunal, then the party which wanted to

112

Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Q:

A:

Q:
A:

Q:
A:
Q:

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

get the arbitration going could go to the President of the International
Court of Justice, at The Hague, and ask him to nominate an arbitrator.
When Libya failed to respond to BP's request for an arbitration, BP
asked the President of the Court to make such a nomination, and the
President nominated a Swedish judge, Judge Lagergren, as sole arbitrator in the case.
Now, did Judge Lagergren hand down an opinion in that case, Mr.
Lauterpacht?
Yes, he handed down an opinion in 1973, a substantial opinion.
Was it October 10, 1973, do you recall?
Yes, that would have been about the date.
Would you summarize for us very briefly your understanding of his
opinion?
The main points which Judge Lagergren decided in his opinion
were: One, that the Libyan action in ending the concession was a
breach of the concession;
Two, that that action was also a violation of international law; and
Three, that British Petroleum was entitled to damages.
He refused to make a declaration that the concession continued in
force.
What was your opinion regarding the correctness of his determination,
or of his refusal to make a determination that the concession continued
in force?
My view was that it was wrong. It was wrong in substance and it was
wrong because it had been reached by a procedurally unsatisfactory
method. And, as a result, I so advised BP.
They decided to ask the judge to reopen his award on that point so
that we could present arguments to him on that matter.
The reason why I had thought that his decision on that one point was
procedurally unsound was because he had decided it without giving us
an opportunity to argue on that aspect of the matter.
So we asked him to reopen the award, and in 1974 he gave a second
award, refusing to reopen the first award.
Did you challenge that second decision?
British Petroleum did not challenge that second decision because by
then, we were well into 1974 and there were indications that there was a
prospect of a settlement with Libya.
Was it ultimately settled with Libya?
British Petroleum ultimately settled with Libya towards the end of 1974.
Let me turn very briefly to another topic, Mr. Lauterpacht. There have
been references by other witnesses who have testified earlier before the
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jury to a decision by an Italian court against British Petroleum early in
1973. Are you familiar with that proceeding?
A: Up to a point, I am familiar with it. I told you a few minutes ago that I
remember going to a meeting in Rome with Advocate Chiomenti and
Prof. Ago, at which there were other BP lawyers present.
I need hardly explain to you, I'm not a BP in-house lawyer, I'm a
counsel from outside to whom BP turns for guidance on occasion. They
have their own in-house lawyers, as well. So that much of the day-today responsibility for dealing with these matters, of course, rests with inhouse BP lawyers.
I.was present at that meeting and we discussed how to go about trying
to recover for BP the oil that was coming into a refinery in, I think,
Sicily. And it was decided to start proceedings in the appropriate Italian court, which was, I think, the court in Syracuse.
So proceedings were started claiming to recover from the people who
had the oil at that time, the identifiable oil, to recover that oil or its
proceeds.
Q: Do you know what the decision of that lower court was, Mr.
Lauterpacht?
A: Yes, the decision of the court in Syracuse was against BP. They decided
that the effect of the Libyan law expropriating BP was to put an end to
the contract on the basis of which BP's right to oil extracted from the
concession area rested.
And so, because that contract had come to an end, in the eyes of the
Syracuse court, the Syracuse court said that there was no basis on which
BP could have obtained title to the oil in Libya.
The Syracuse court, at the same time, said that it was not going into
the question of whether the action of the Libyan government in terminating the concession was contrary to international law.
And then, having said those two things, it went on to say that BP had
acted in good faith in bringing the proceedings in Italy.
Q: Was that decision appealed, Mr. Lauterpacht?
A: At this point I'm not certain, because I wasn't involved in what happened after that. My impression is that the intention was that it should
be appealed to the Italian Court of Cassation. I'm not aware of any
decision by any higher Italian court on the subject.
Q: Is the Italian Court of Cassation the highest Italian court?
A: I believe that it is.
Q: And to the best of your knowledge, the Court of Cassation never
decided the case adversely to BP?
A: As far as I am aware, the Italian Court of Cassation never decided on
the case.
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Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, did either the decision of the lower Italian court or the
decision of the arbitrator alter your opinion as to the propriety of British
Petroleum filing suit against those who traded in hot Libyan Sarir oil?
A: I think it is important to try and recall the dates here. May I just first of
all say the basic answer to your question is no, it did not change my
view. And in saying that I think it's important to recall the dates.
Nationalization in Libya was at the end of 1971. The decision of the
Syracuse court, I think, in February of '73, and the decision of the arbitrator in October, '73.
So that, of course, in the period when it really mattered, that is to say
from end of '71 to February, '73, when oil was being exported, clearly
those decisions didn't exist and, therefore, wouldn't have affected my
judgment.
When the Syracuse judgment was delivered, it certainly did not lead
me to think that this constituted a satisfactory basis on which to advise
BP not to litigate in other countries.
If I might just digress for a moment to explain this to you, it's really
central, I think, to the kind of problem that arises.
It must be understood that because Country A, when faced by a problem, decides it in one way, it does not at all follow that Country B will
decide that same question in the same way. It may have different procedural rules and its judges may have a different outlook. Those two factors are alone sufficient to make one realize that one can never assume a
uniformity of outlook amongst the judges of the various countries.
So the fact that the Syracuse court decided the way it did, did not for
a moment lead me to believe that an English judge or an American
judge or a French judge would necessarily look at the matter in the
same way. Indeed, at that time I would probably have contemplated the
prospect of an appeal to the higher Italian court. I was not really
involved at that moment. But it wouldn't have surprised me if the
Court of Cassation had overruled the Syracuse court.
I was involved for seventeen years, for example, in litigation between
the East German Zeiss, the people who make cameras and binoculars,
and the West German Zeiss in England, as to who was entitled to use
the name Zeiss, which was a very valuable name to use in selling optical
goods.
Now, that English litigation was only one item in a whole range of
cases which Zeiss was conducting all over the world on this very question of who could call themselves Zeiss. There were cases in East Germany, West Germany, Pakistan, Australia, the United States, and I
forget what other countries, but that's enough. And in each of those
countries-the decisions varied. There was no basis on which one could
assume that one country would necessarily decide the same way as
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another country. And I was involved in that for seventeen years, from
1954 to 1971.
And with that kind of experience I couldn't possibly have said that
because the Italian court decided negatively to BP, therefore, any other
court would follow suit.
I was also asked just now whether the outcome of the arbitration,
Judge Lagergren's award, would lead me to have changed my view.
And the answer is no, because as I have just said to you, I thought that
Judge Lagergren's view was wrong, wrong in one respect. He was
clearly right in saying it was a breach of concession, clearly right to say
that it was a breach of international law. I thought he was wrong to say
that the situation had meant that in law BP's rights in Libya had come
to an end.
I thought it perfectly proper that the question should be reargued in
whatever court might be appropriate, because other courts might, very
understandably, take a different view from Judge Lagergren's.
Mr. Lauterpacht, did you become aware that the Libyans expropriated
the Hunt interest in Concession No. 65?
Yes, I did.
Let me digress just for a moment here.
You are aware that Concession No. 65 in Libya was originally
obtained by the Hunts, are you not?
Yes.
And that BP subsequently obtained an undivided one-half interest in
Concession No. 65?
Yes.
So when the Libyans expropriated the Hunts' interest they were, in
effect, taking the other half of the concession that they had taken earlier
from BP?
Yes, sir.
Now, that expropriation occurred in late May or early June of 1973, did
it not?
Yes.
Did you form an opinion as to the legality of the Libyan expropriation
of the Hunts' concession?
Yes, I did.
And what was your view of the legality of that expropriation?
It seemed to me to be as illegal as the initial seizure of BP's interest, and
for similar reasons.
Did the government of the United States take the position that that was
an illegal expropriation?
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A: I believe it did.
Q: When the government of a country such as the United States or Britain
takes the position that an expropriation by a foreign country is illegal, is
that a relevant factor that you consider in international law?
A: Certainly it is. The jury will remember that when I was talking about
the kind of writing that I had done in the field of international law, I
mentioned the importance of my publication called British Practice in
InternationalLaw,and I said that there was also a publication based on
the same idea called Digest of United States Practice in International
Law.

Now, why are these kinds of publications important? Because international law is a less easy body of law to identify than, say, the law of
the state of Texas. In this state you know if you want to find a rule of
law that you either look at the statutes of the Texas legislature or you
look at the decisions of the Texas courts or you look at the relevant
United States federal legislation or the decisions of the United States
federal courts, and basically that's where the law is.
International law is not so perfectly formed as that. There are a
number of international arbitral decisions and cases, and of course you
look at those, and there are quite a number of international treaties.
They are the equivalent of legislation, but they don't cover every point.
So you have got a great area where there is nothing in the way of decisions or treaties.
And in those circumstances you look for the practice of states. You
say, "What have states done about this in the past? What are their attitudes?" If you can find sufficiently uniform attitudes, then those attitudes are evidence of what we call customary international law.
Customary international law covers an enormous part of the legal
relations between states.
And as I say, in identifying a custom of international law, the practice
of states is important.
So now I come to the question that was put to me, what was the relevance of those notes from the British government and the United States
government to Libya?
The answer is that those notes are evidence of what the British and
the United States governments regarded as the relevant customary international law.
So the notes have, if you will, a double quality. They are both a
reflection of what the government thought the law was at the time when
they sent the note, and they are also a contribution to the future content
of the law.
Q: Thank you, Mr. Lauterpacht.
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Mr. Lauterpacht, after the expropriation of the Hunt interest in Concession No. 65, did you have occasion to meet with an attorney for the
Hunts?
Yes. It must have been shortly after the expropriation, which would
have been perhaps in May or June of '73, Mr. Conant came over to
London to visit with British Petroleum and to talk to them about the
situation and to find out what they had been doing in their own comparable position which had happened two years previously. So there was
a meeting at Britannic House, that is the headquarters of British Petroleum in London, to which, as outside counsel, I was invited.
This was a meeting of attorneys?
This was a meeting of lawyers, that is to say, a barrister, like myself, and
the in-house lawyers of BP and their solicitors.
And you met with Mr. Conant at that time?
Yes.
That's the same Mr. Conant who is sitting here at the counsel table?
Yes, he is.
Was the purpose of that meeting to discuss what proper legal strategy
would be to protect the rights of the parties?
I'm not sure that I would express it quite that way. My understanding
of the purpose of the meeting was that Mr. Conant came over to find out
how BP had done things and to solicit guidance and views. And guidance and views were what were offered at that meeting.
Did Mr. Conant specifically solicit your views and guidance?
I suppose in a sense he might have specifically solicited my views. We
all were sitting at a table and we all participated in the discussion. But I
certainly expressed my views.
Now, Mr. Lauterpacht, I don't want to ask you a question that calls for
an immodest answer, but I take it at this meeting of lawyers you would
have been acknowledged as the most expert international lawyer there?
Yes.
Certainly Mr. Conant would have recognized that, I take it?
I hope so.
Would you tell us briefly what views you expressed to Mr. Conant?
WellPerhaps I should try a narrower series of questions, I don't want to force
you to try to recall the entire meeting, then Mr. Matthews can ask you
more about it, if he likes.
Did you express a view to Mr. Conant about the legality of the Libyan expropriation of the Hunt interest?
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A: I'm sure I must have. I cannot conceive of a meeting having taken place
without an expression of view on the major relevant legal elements: One, the question of the international legality of the seizure;
two, the effect on the concession; and three, what happens next.
Q: What factor, Mr. Lauterpacht, would make it appropriate for BP and
Hunt to proceed jointly in pursuit litigation?
A: The fact was that they were owners in undivided half shares of the
rights in Concession No. 65 and, therefore, problems relating to the
identification of particular parcels of crude oil would obviously be eased
if they acted together.
Also, in the nature of the situation it was natural that they should act
together, because their rights had been affected by precisely the same
kinds of measures and the resulting legal situation was virtually
identical.
Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, at the meeting between BP's lawyers and Mr. Conant,
which you attended, was there any discussion of taking any extralegal
steps to pursue their remedies, such as-to pursue their rights, excuse
me, such as threatening not to deal with people or withdrawing funds
from banks, or anything of that nature?
A: None. We were only concerned with legal matters.
Q: And in following the course of the litigation over the Libyan expropriation to the extent that you have, has it ever come to your attention that
any extra-legal steps were taken by either BP or the Hunts?
A: No. Such action has not come to my attention, nor would it, in the
nature of things, if it ever happened, have come to my attention
because, since I'm outside counsel, I'm not concerned with any day-today activities of either company. But I have never heard of any such
action.
Q: If people are going to take extralegal steps, they go to their lawyers to
take them?
A: That would be my understanding.
I must say it would be-I have been involved with BP and AngloIranian for thirty years, and it just doesn't seem to me to be the kind of
thing they would do.
Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, if you were retained today by a client whose property
had been confiscated by a foreign government in the way that, in your
judgment, made it illegal, would you advise that client today to institute
pursuit litigation?
A: Yes.
Q: Would you advise them to publish advertisements and to attempt to
investigate and give notice to those who might be dealing in the hot
expropriated property?
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A: Yes.
Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, I had asked you earlier about what has been admitted
into evidence as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4, which was the announcement that
BP issued at the time the Libyans expropriated its half interest in Concession No. 65. Would you please compare it to Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5,
which is the announcement that was made by Nelson Bunker Hunt at
the time the Libyans expropriated the remaining one half of Concession
No. 65. From a legal perspective, are those, in substance, the same
announcements?
A: In substance they are the same announcements, just small verbal variation between the two, in the introduction and the Hunts' announcement
of a reference to energy shortages and the amount of oil available for its
national commerce. But apart from that they are basically the same
text.
Q: In your opinion was the announcement made by Nelson Bunker Hunt a
necessary and proper action for him to take in order to pursue his
rights?
A: Well, I have already said, in relation to the BP announcement, that I
thought it was necessary and proper, and the reasons I gave for saying
that are equally applicable to the announcement by Hunt.
Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, does it appear that the announcement by Nelson
Bunker Hunt-that in preparing it his lawyers relied heavily on the BP
announcement and precedent?
A: Well, there are certain similarities of wording. In fact, they both begin
in exactly the same way, "contrary to established principles of international law," and so on. One would assume that the lawyers for Hunt
had had in front of them the text of the BP announcement, and it would
have been perfectly reasonable for them to do so, just as BP, in preparing the 1971 announcement, had before it the text of the other
announcements.
Q: Really nothing sinister about lawyers copying work from other lawyers,
is there? Isn't that widely done in the profession even in England?
A: They do it all the time. We have great volumes of precedents and forms
which we tend to follow, and this BP announcement is a precedent or
form in this particular area, which, since I had a hand in drafting it
myself, I would regard as a model.
MR.

REASONER:

Thank you, Mr. Lauterpacht. We pass the witness,

Your Honor.
All right. Cross examination, please, Mr. Matthews.
MR. MATTHEWS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
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Cross Examination by Mr. Matthews
Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, my name is Dan Matthews. I believe we met for the
first time this morning, did we not?
A: Yes, sir, we did.
Q: Although, I must confess, your name has floated across my desk on a
number of occasions.
Mr. Lauterpacht, you testified that you were retained by Hunt to
appear and testify in here today?
A: Yes.
Q: It's true, is it not, sir, that you appear pretty regularly as an expert witness, do you not?
A: No, not pretty regularly. I have testified that I have appeared on behalf
of the government of the United States as an expert witness, and that is
the only occasion in which I have done so. I appear as counsel
normally.
Q: All right, sir. This is only your second appearance as an expert witness?
A: Yes, in the United States.
Q: All right, sir. Now, you don't purport to give advice on U.S. antitrust
laws, do you, Mr. Lauterpacht?
A: No, I do not.
Q: And you are not here to advise either this Court or jury that what Hunt
or BP did or did not do violated U.S. antitrust laws, or did not violate
U.S. antitrust laws.
A: I am not here for that purpose.
Q: All right. Now, Mr. Lauterpacht, as I understand your testimony, your
analysis of this problem can be broken down into roughly two categories. Number one, was the nationalization in violation of international
law?
A: Yes.
Q: And number two, are pursuit actions justified?
A: Perhaps I shouldn't have said yes to your first identification of Item One
without hearing your identification of Item Two. The question of, are
pursuit actions justified involves Item One, whereas, Item One does not
necessarily involve Item Two.
Q: I understand that. I understand they are necessarily entwined. But
would you agree with me your advice to BP was twofold; number one,
the nationalization violated international law, and secondly, pursuit
actions are justified?
A: Yes.
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Q: All right, sir. Now, I want to start out-I will talk about both of those
categories before we are through, but I want to start out with the second
one, if we may: Are pursuit actions justified. And I believe you told
me, or you told this jury that your advice to your client was limited to
the advice to send out a notice such as is Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 4, which
is the announcement by BP, and the advice that they had the right to
pursue the oil by suit in the hands of purchasers from Libya, is that a
fair characterization of your testimony?
A: Subject to one qualification, yes. The qualification is this: You ended
up, I think, by saying, my advice to them was they were entitled to initiate litigation to pursue the oil. My advice to them was that this was a
proper course to pursue. But the determination of whether it was a
proper course to pursue within any particular jurisdiction must, of
course, rest with the lawyers who are qualified within the particular
legal system of that country.
Q: I understand that, Mr. Lauterpacht. But I want to make sure I understand that your advice to your client, BP, was limited to the propriety of
sending out the notice and of following that notice up with pursuit litigation when and where it found that people had purchased Sarir crude.
A: I don't mean to be avoiding your question. Certainly, my advice
included those items. My difficulty is with your verb, limited, because I
am not quite sure what you are excluding by reference to that word.
Q: All right, sir. Do you know and are you aware that BP instituted a
fairly intensive worldwide investigation to determine movements of
Sarir crude and who might be purchasing, or suspected of purchasing
Sarir crude?
A: Yes, I would have been aware of that.
Q: Was that sort of thing within the parameters of your advice to your
client?
A: When you say, "that sort of thing," obviously, as a part of one's consideration of what is to be done, and if one is contemplating the possibility
of pursuit litigation, naturally one is saying to one's client one must
have some facts on the basis of which the litigation can be instituted.

Q: Then didn't you, in fact, advige BP that in your opinion it was okay for
them to institute an investigation to determine movements of Sarir, and
who might be interested in dealing in it?
A: No, I would not advise them that, because that question would never
have been posed, as to whether it was okay. We just assumed that it
was.

Q: Did you know, Mr. Lauterpacht, that when BP would identify somebody by that investigation that they suspected might be interested in
dealing with Sarir crude, they would follow that information up and
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personally contact those people and threaten suit if they touched it?
Did you know that? That's all I'm asking.
That I would probably have known about in general terms, without
knowing it specifically.
Did BP specifically come to you and seek your advice in doing that sort
of thing?
No.
So that this would have been something they did on their own?
That's right. That's what I call an in-house matter.
Did BP or Hunt tell you that they had learned of the sailing of a ship
called the Hilda, which they expected to have a cargo derived from
Sarir crude?
Is the Hilda the ship that went to Syracuse?
No, sir.
Then I don't know which-if you would tell me to which port the Hilda
was going, and whether she was a subject of proceedings, I might be
able to recall, but as a name it doesn't mean anything to me.
All right, sir. Did either BP or Hunt ever come to you and ask your
advice about the legality or the advisability of trying to get a shipowner,
whose ship was under charter to another, to bring it into port contrary to
the orders of the charterer?
No.
And if that was done in the pursuit of Sarir crude, this was something
outside the parameters of your advice?
Outside the area of my involvement in the matter entirely.
In giving your advice to BP and to Hunt that it was all right to, as we
have called it, chase or pursue Sarir crude, did you understand that your
advice to them was limited to the pursuit litigation, the object of which
was to recover bits and pieces of Sarir crude around the world?
My advice was limited to the recovery of specific cargoes.
Did you ever advise with them concerning a larger objective?
You would have to tell me what you mean by a larger objective. I don't
immediately see that my advice on the question of pursuit litigation
could be related to a larger objective.
Were you ever told by either BP or Hunt that their objective was not to
recover bits and pieces of Sarir around the world, but was, in fact, to
recover their concession, to force Libya to give them their concession
back?
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MR. REASONER: Your Honor, for the record I want to object to the form
of the question. Mr. Matthews has fallen into the habit of referring to bits
and pieces of oil, which is a nonsensical term. I take it by that he is referring to specific cargoes of oil, but I don't want our English friend to think
that that is some American usage that is proper, and therefore I would
object to that characterization.
THE COURT: All right, I will overrule the objection, and in the event that
Mr. Lauterpacht doesn't understand the question, he can say so and we'll
get Mr. Matthews to clarify it.

Q: Did you understand my question?
A: Please repeat it, because I was distracted by the objection.
Q: Did either BP or Hunt ever reveal to you, or tell you, that they had some
objective in pursuing Sarir crude other than recovering cargoes of Sarir
crude around the world?
A: No, they did not.
Q: In the hands of third parties?
A: No, they did not.
Q: Let's assume, Mr. Lauterpacht, that in order to recover cargoes from
around the world, from third parties, it is necessary and advisable to
send out a notice such as is Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 4, to accomplish just
what you said you want to accomplish, and that is get around what we
would call the bona fide purchaser rule; if you truly want to recover that
oil, isn't it true that the last thing you want to do is scare off people from
buying it?
A: Well, that's not really a judgment for me to form. The question you put
to me is a business judgment. As a lawyer my concern is with the possibility that people may buy the oil, and my advice is that, in anticipation
of such purchases, advertisements should be issued and warnings should
be given, but the question of what one is motivated to do, what one is
trying to achieve in terms of a more general kind, such as is implicit in
your remark, is not a matter for me at all.
Q: And as a lawyer isn't it true that your advice to your clientwould be,
look, Mr. Client, if you really want to recover that oil you will give this
notice, that is sufficient to protect you against the bona fide purchaser
rule, but then you will back up and let somebody buy it, so you can grab
it, isn't that true?
A: No, I don't regard that last proposition as falling within the range of my
advice. I do not give business advice, I give legal advice.
Q: So that if it could be concluded that the purpose of BP and Hunt in
giving warnings and in visiting people and in calling people was to dis-
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suade them from purchasing Sarir, that would not be, within the realm
of the advice you gave them?
That is not my concern.
And if they went around trying to scare people off from purchasing
Sarir crude, it was without your advice?
Yes.
Mr. Lauterpacht, I want to for a moment-by the way, did either Hunt
or BP seek your advice on the possibility of regaining their interest in
Concession No. 65?
Yes, in the following sense: I speak now of BP, not of Hunt, because to
Hunt I never gave formal advice. I have indicated already that my
involvement with Hunt was participation in the meeting at BP, when
Mr. Conant came to seek views and guidance, but I did not formally
tender advice to Hunt. But as regards BP, the answer is that of course
we contemplated the possibility in law of recovering the concession, and
in the arbitration proceedings we sought a declaration that the concession was still in force.
Did BP discuss with you any other method of attempting to regain the
concession other than by arbitration?
No. I do not know what other method you could have in mind.
Your testimony is no, they did not? Neither BP nor Hunt discussed
with you the possibility of regaining the concession by any method
other than arbitration?
No.
Okay, sir. Now, as you have testified, it's true, is it not, that BP was
what is known as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company?
Until about 1954 or 1955.
They had a concession, or the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had a concession in Iran, did it not?
Yes.
Which was nationalized by Iran in 1951?
Yes.
Now, I believe you testified that following that concession BP sought the
advice of your father as to what they should do?
The evidence which I gave related to the question which they put to him
regarding the possibility of recovering cargoes of oil that might be
exported by Iran to individual foreign purchasers.
Okay, sir. And you told the jury that your first reaction to the problem
was adverse to BP's position?
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Luther v. Sagor and Princess Paley Olga v. Weiss, and these are two
British precedents in the Court of Appeal, the prospects of such an
action by Anglo-Iranian were bad. That was my initial reaction.
And did I understand you to relate that to the rule of law which in
England would generally foreclose you from looking behind the acts of
a state taken in its own territory?
That is not the way I expressed it in my evidence, nor is it the way that I
would put it otherwise. My reason for regarding those two authorities
as controlling is not any English concept of act of state, which I think is
the shorthand formula for what you have just put to me, but was
because of a rule of English law to the effect that when you are dealing
with questions of title to property situated abroad you apply the lex
situs.
Okay, sir. And I believe you testified that after further study you
inclined to change your view and to advise that pursuit actions were
possible.
I did more than incline to change my view. I changed my view.
All right, sir.
I came clearly to the conclusion that as a matter of principle the view I
had originally expressed was wrong.
And based on your advice I believe I'm correct in stating that BP filed
approximately ten pursuit actions?
Your recollection of the number is better than mine.
My information is eight were filed in Italy, one was filed in Japan and
one was filed in Aden.
Certainly I remember the countries, Italy, Aden and Japan as being the
relevant countries.
How many of those suits were won in Italy?
I'm not aware of BP having won in Italy, so I can't tell you how many
they won. But I know they did not win in Italy.
And it's true, is it not, the Japanese suit was a loss to BP?
Correct.
The Aden suit was a win, was it not?
Correct.
And that's in the case called the Rosemary?
Yes.
Aden was at the time a British Crown Colony?
Yes.
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Q: And you know, do you not, that much has been written about the
Rosemary?
A: Much has been written on the Rosemary and on the whole problem.
Q: And among those things written about the Rosemary are stories or articles about collusion between the master and a fighter pilot to bring the
ship into port?
A: I have never heard the story in that version. The story of the presence of
an aircraft had been put in a different form in the course, if I remember
right, of the proceedings in Aden. It was argued on behalf of the
defense that the ship had been brought into port against its will. But
that argument, I think, had no relevance to the issue of law, and I cannot remember whether the Judge passed on it or not. It has no relevance to the legal issue.
Q: England is a common law country, is it not, in general?
A: Yes.
Q: And what that means is that the law has evolved over the years?
A: Yes.
Q: And a good part of the law is what we call judge-made law. A judge
will say something and later judges will either pick it up and make it
reliable or it may be rejected?
A: Yes.
Q: It's true, is it not, that only one subsequent English court has ever cited
or mentioned the Aden in a published opinion-I mean, the Rosemary
in a published opinion?
A: I have never carried out an assessment of how many times a court has
referred to Rosemary. But the issue in Rosemary has certainly been considered by an English Court, and I can remember one occasion, but an
important occasion, on which that was done.
Q: So that, Mr. Lauterpacht, when BP came to you in late 1971 or early
1972 to seek your advice concerning the nationalization by Libya and
what it should do in response to that nationalization you had before you
and had well in mind your prior history with the Iranian nationalization, did you not?
A: Yes.
Q: And there's no question but what you knew that you had lost in Italy,
you had lost in Japan, you had lost an overwhelming majority, shall we
say, of the pursuit actions you had filed in the field?
A: I am prepared to subscribe to the proposition that BP had lost in Italy
and Japan. I'm not prepared to subscribe to the relevance of the proposition that the majority mattered. What it is essential to say was that the
loss was in two different countries, one in Italy and one in Japan.
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Q: Can we conclude that you disagreed with the courts that had held
adversely to BP and maintained your position that you were right?
A: Yes, you may so conclude.
Q: All right, sir.
Mr. Lauterpacht, you are no doubt familiar with what is known as
Libyan Petroleum Law No. 25 of 1955?
A: Yes, I am.
Q: You have looked at that and you have studied it, have you not?
A: I looked at it and I studied it closely in connection with the preparation
of the arbitration.
Q: Will you read for the jury, please, Item Subsection No. 1 of Article No.
1 of the Libyan Petroleum Law No. 25?
A: Article 1, headed Petroleum Property of State. Paragraph 1:
"All petroleum in Libya in its natural state in strata is the property of
the Libyan state.
"2. No person shall explore or prospect for, mine or produce petroleum in any part of Libya unless authorized by a permit or concession
issued under this law."
Q: Now, you know, do you not, Mr. Lauterpacht, that Libyan Law No. 25
is the very law under which Concession No. 65 was granted?
A: Yes.
Q: And you had that available to you and took it into consideration in
giving advice to BP with regard to whether pursuit actions were
justified?
A: Yes, I certainly did.
Q: Would you agree with me, Mr. Lauterpacht, that if petroleum in strata
was not owned by BP at the time of the nationalization it wasn't taken
from them by the nationalization decree?
A: Yes.
I ought, perhaps, to amplify my answer. And that isQ: Excuse me, Mr. Lauterpacht, I'm sure that Hunt's counsel will give you
plenty of opportunity, and under our system I am entitled to your
answer.
MR. REASONER: Well, Your Honor, obviously that's for you to say and
not Mr. Matthews. I would object to Mr. Matthews cutting off Mr. Lauterpacht if he feels his answer in its form is misleading.
THE COURT: Let me ask the witness: Is this an explanation of your
answer, or is this something in addition?
Counsel is correct that he's entitled to obtain from you an answer to his
question. In the event you wish to answer and then explain your answer I
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will permit you to do that. However, I don't wish you to volunteer matters
that may be peripherally relevant but not directly in point in response to his
question.
THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honor, I don't want to abuse my position as a
witness. The question put to me was, if the oil in the ground is the property
of the state of Libya then the expropriation took nothing away from BP.
It is correct, Your Honor, to say that the law did not take away the oil in
strata from BP. But what the expropriation did take away was BP's exclusive right to extract the oil from the strata and at the moment of extraction
to acquire title.
THE COURT:

All right. You are explaining your answer.
Thank you.
All right.

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Q: Did I understand you to agree that the nationalization did not take from
Hunt title to the oil, or BP?
A: It did not take title to the oil in the ground.

Q: In the ground?
A: In the ground.
Q: What it did was take from Hunt and BP the contractual right that Libya
had given Hunt and BP to explore for the oil and to produce and to
export it once it is produced?
A: And something more than that. It took away from them the right to
extract and sell.
Q: Yes, sir.
A: And in so doing took away from them their right-their exclusive right
to acquire the title to the oil as it came out of the ground. The system,
as I understand it, of Libyan law is very simple: While in the ground
the oil belongs to Libya. Libya gives her right to the concessionaire to
take the oil out of the ground, and in giving the concessionaire that right
gives the concessionaire the sole right to acquire property in that oil as it
comes out of the ground. Nobody else can get that title except the concessionaire. Therefore, any oil that comes out of the ground becomes
the property of the concessionaire.
Q: And you had the Libyan Law No. 25 available to you when you gave
your advice to Hunt and collaterally-I mean, to BP and collaterally to
Hunt, did you not?
A: Yes.
Q: All right, sir. Now, with regard to your last delivered opinion as you sat
there in the witness chair, and that is, that when the oil reached the
wellhead it became the oil of BP and Hunt, does that apply whether or
not they were the producers of the oil?

Nationalization and InternationalLaw

A No.
Q: It only applies, does it not, when BP and Hunt are producing the oil?
A: No, that is not the answer I gave. I meant by the answer I gave you, my
ultimate answer, I meant to say that their right, the right of BP and
Hunt to title to the oil as it comes out of the ground, is a right that
operates regardless of who took the oil out of the ground. Perhaps I
may explain that, Your Honor. What I mean is this: Suppose that, during the period of what I might call normal operations of BP and Hunt in
Libya, a group of bandits had come along and taken control of the wells
and had produced during that period. To whom would that oil have
belonged? To the bandits or to BP and Hunt?
My answer is, to BP and Hunt. In other words, under the petroleum
law of Libya the only person who is entitled to acquire title to the oil as
it comes out of the ground is the person named in the concession. BP
and Hunt are the named concessionaires. They alone can get title to the
oil even if taken out by a third person.
Q: Rather than referring to bandits let's refer to the real situation, because I
want to make sure I have got your opinion straight. BP and Hunt were
nationalized, were they not, or expropriated, if you want to call it that?
A: Yes.
Q: And after the nationalization or expropriation they were in no position
to produce the oil, that is true?
A: Yes.
Q: Here comes a drop of oil-the field is being operated by Libya, here
comes a drop of oil up the hole, pops through the wellhead, whose oil is
that drop, who does it belong to?
A: To BP and Hunt, and in undivided half shares.
Q: What do you do with the Libyan royalty rights?
A: That's something that has to be worked out collaterally. You are asking
me about title to the oil.
Q: As I read the concession agreement the Libyans retained a 12 percent
royalty right intact. That is, they own 12 percent of the drop of oil that
came out. What do you do with that 12 percent under your analysis?
A: That is a question of interpretation of the concession. Perhaps I ought
to try and convey to the jury my understanding of the position. Under
the concession BP and Hunt are given the right to extract and sell the
oil. Of course, they have to pay something to Libya for that right. The
agreement is that they pay Libya in two ways basically, one by money
and the other by oil in kind. So, the question, as I understand it, which
Mr. Matthews is putting to me is this: surely if Libya is entitled, of
course, to oil in kind, payment in oil for the rights which BP and Hunt
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are exercising, surely he's suggesting Libya acquires title to the royalty
oil at the moment when it comes out of the ground. My understanding
is different. My understanding is that the oil comes out of the ground
and becomes at that moment the property only of BP and Hunt. It's
true that Libya has a right to oil in kind, to payment in oil, which BP
and Hunt conveyed to it out of what BP and Hunt get out of the ground.
But at the moment when the oil comes out it becomes the property of
BP and Hunt, because that is what the petroleum law says.
Mr. Lauterpacht, are you aware of any experts in international oil that
hold opinions contrary to yours in that regard?
I am aware of the fact that there are different views held. Let me, perhaps, just explain that. We are talking about the character of the Libyan petroleum law. That's a matter of Libyan law, basically, and when
I look at it I don't look at it as an international lawyer. I just look at it
as a lawyer who is an international lawyer but who is reading the Libyan law for what it does in Libyan law, and for how it then may be
looked at by an international lawyer. Therefore, when one talks about
international lawyers having views about that Libyan law, that is not
quite the way I would express it. One looks at it as the lawyer looks at
Libyan law, and then attaches to that one's view of international law.
You discussed on direct examination, Mr. Lauterpacht, the arbitration
proceeding that BP filed against Libya after the nationalization.
I have mentioned that.
It is true, is it not, that the list of lawyers representing BP in that arbitration proceeding reads like a legal who's who?
The lawyers were a distinguished group.
You had a very impressive group of lawyers representing BP, including
yourself, did you not?
Yes.
You had experts in international law, true?
Yes.
You had experts in comparative law?
We had experts in systems of foreign law.
You had experts in foreign law, as you would say, you had experts in
property law, did you not?
Not as such, no, sir. The team was composed, as I remember it-and
I'm sure you'll correct me if I am wrong--of myself as leader of the
team, and associated with me-and I didn't refresh my memory about
these names-were Dr. Mann and Mr. Collins, who are both international lawyers listed in London. In addition we had somebody from
France, Professor Weil, who gave us guidance on certain aspects of law
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that were peculiarly French, and we had a Professor Zweigert, who was
a distinguished German professor, and we had a Professor W. L. M.
Reese, from Columbia, who gave us advice on U.S. law.
Have I missed out anybody?
Q: I don't have the list in front of me, but I do recall it being impressive,
Mr. Lauterpacht, and I believe you testified that Libya did not appear.
A: Correct.
Q: They were not represented?
A: Correct.
Q: It is true, is it not, Mr. Lauterpacht, that while the arbitrator held that
you should be entitled to compensation from Libya, he also held that
you could not get the concession back?
A: That is not quite a precise description of the arbitrator's holdings. He
held, one, there was a breach of the concession; two, that there was a
breach of international law; three, that we were entitled to damages; and
four, he refused our request for a declaration of the continuance in force
of the concession.
Q: Okay, sir, I'll accept that. I believe you told us that he made that latter
declaration after what you thought was an inadequate presentation, or
an inadequate opportunity to make a presentation?
A: That is correct. If you wish, I shall explain it more fully.
Q: No, sir. I was just asking you if that was not correct, and I think you
have answered.
Isn't it true that on your motion for reconsideration, or for rehearing,
or whatever it was, you gave him a full and complete presentation of
your views in that regard, with supporting authorities and everything
you could determine was reasonable and necessary to put in the
proceeding?
A: To answer that accurately I need to explain what we sought to do. The
arbitrator had given the award. Libya had not appeared. Only BP had
presented argument. The arbitrator decided, at this particular point, on
the continuity of the concession by reference to considerations which
had not been examined by BP in its argument before the arbitrator. BP
had said to the arbitrator, and I paraphrase, look, if there are any points
that give you trouble, if there are any aspects of the case which we
haven't touched upon, which you think are material, please let us know.
But don't decide the case by reference to a point that we haven't
touched on, because, in effect, that wouldn't be fair, that wouldn't be
giving us a chance to consider the points that are put against us.
Notwithstanding that request by BP, the arbitrator expressed the
view, took it upon himself to decide the case, on that particular point by
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reference to a series of arguments and authorities that were quite
outside what we had dealt with in our arguments.
Therefore we thought his award was wrong in two respects: We
thought that the substantive conclusion, the actual conclusion, on the
point was wrong, but we also felt that it was procedurally wrong. In
other words, that he should never have touched that point without having given us the opportunity to discuss it with him.
Therefore the only procedure that was open to us was not an appeal,
was not a rehearing. What we had to do was to ask him to treat his
award as invalid by virtue of the fact that he had made this procedural
mistake, and therefore to reopen the case on the basis of invalidity of his
award. We wanted him to hear our further argument, and then to reach
a final conclusion on the merits of the case. That was what we wanted.
So we addressed to the arbitrator a memorandum which contained an
indication of the authorities that went contrary to the position he had
taken.
I say all of this because Mr. Matthews suggested to me that we put in
all of these documents, that we argued the case in full on that aspect.
The answer is no. We put to the arbitrator sufficient authority to indicate to him the possibility-indeed, with certainty, in our view-that he
was wrong. He reached the conclusion, on the basis of our memorandum asking him to reopen the case, that he would not reopen the case,
and that was that. Therefore we never had the opportunity, fully, to
deploy all of our arguments in answer to what we believed was his
wrong reasoning on this question of the continuity of the concession.
Let me make sure I have got it straight in my mind. You argued in the
main proceeding the authorities and arguments that you thought should
have led the arbitrator to restore the concession to you.
We argued the authorities to support our proposition that we were entitled to a declaration of the continuity of the concession.
He came out with his decision contrary to your opinion, but he utilized
other arguments and authorities in support of his decision?
That's right. He took a completely different tack.
And then you tried to get him to reopen the proceeding, attempting to
convince him that what he had done was invalid, or wrong?
That's right.
And he refused to reopen the proceeding?
That's correct.
Afternoon Session
THE COURT: Mr. Matthews
MR. MATTHEWS: Thank you, Your Honor.
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Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, I now have before me what I believe to be a complete
list of appearances for BP in the arbitration proceeding. If I can, let's go
through these and make sure I have a complete list. Of course, as you
testified, you led the team. Mr. R.W. Bentham?
A: Yes.
Q: He was an in-house BP lawyer, was he not?
A: Yes.
Q: Mr. K. Rokison, R-o-k-i-s-o-n?
A: Yes. He's a member of the Bar.
Q: Mr. J.G. Collier?
A: Also a member of the Bar.
Q: This is the English Bar?
A: Yes.
Q: P.N. Legh-Jones?
A: Also a member of the Bar.
Q: F.A. Mann?
A: A leading London solicitor.
Q: L.A. Collins?
A: Also a leading London solicitor.
Q: Professor I. Foighel?
A: A Danish professor of international law.
Q: Mr. J. Loyrette?
A: Mr. Loyrette is a member of the French Bar.
Q: Professor M.A. Omar?
A: He was an Egyptian lawyer.
Q: Professor A. Phillip?
A: A Danish lawyer.
Q: Professor W.L.M. Reese?
A: He's a professor of law at Columbia University.
Q: Professor P. Weil?
A: He's a professor of law at the University of Paris.
Q: Professor W.F. Young, Jr.?
A: I cannot recall who he was. He may have been associated with Professor Zweigert, but I simply do not recall.
Q: The sheet that I'm looking at says Professor W.F. Young, Jr. and Professor K. Zweigert.
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A: Professor Zweigert was a director of Max Planck Institute for comparative law at Hamburg.
Q: Mr. D.A.G. Sarre, of course, is the legal adviser to BP?
A: He was at that time.
Q: And Mr. K. Jameson was the lawyer on his staff, Mr. Sarre's stal?.
A: Yes.
Q: And I believe you testified that the Libyan Arabian Republic did not
appear to present its side or oppose your side?
A: Correct.
Q: Now, the holding of the tribunal of the sole arbitrator on the title issue,
or what I would call the title issue, was, I believe, first that under international law he believed that the nationalization was effective to take
away from BP whatever it may have had?
A: That was his view.
Q: And secondly, he made reference also in that vein to the section of Libyan Law No. 25, which I had you read to the jury, did he not?
A: He referred to that at the very end when he was dealing with what we
called Declaration No. 5.
Q: Yes, sir.
A: We requested various declarations. In Declaration No. 4 1 think we had
asked for a declaration for the continuity of the concession. In Declaration No. 5 we had asked for declaration of our title to the oil. As
regards Declaration No. 4 he concluded there was no continuity, so that
we had lost. So that when it came to Declaration No. 5 he said simply: it follows from my view about the lack of continuity of the concession that the basis on which you claim to have title, namely, your
exclusive right to extract, does not exist; therefore I will not make that
declaration. Therefore, he said this with regard also to the terms of Law
25.
Q: Now, before lunch, Mr. Lauterpacht, you expressed an opinion that title
to oil in Concession No. 65 passed at the wellhead to BP or Hunt, no
matter who was operating the concession and producing the oil?
A: Yes.
Q: That, of course, is your opinion based solely on international law, is it
not?
A: It's my opinion based on my reading of the Libyan law and my understanding of the position under Libyan law, coupled with the fact that in
international law we would deny efficacy to the Libyan law which terminated the concession.
Q: And, again, that's your opinion and was not Judge Lagergren's opinion?
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A: Correct.
Q: It is true, Mr. Lauterpacht, that as you have told us, I think not once but
twice during your testimony here, that your rules in England prohibit
you from advising with regard to the laws of a particular country other
than your own?
A: They exclude you from giving formal advice to that effect.
Q: And so you would be precluded from advising your client or, in fact,
this jury concerning the effect of Libyan law in Libya, would you not?
A: It's not quite as simple as that. The position is that we do not hold
ourselves-English lawyers do not hold themselves out as capable of
advising on any foreign legal system in which they are not qualified.
I'm not qualified in Libyan law and therefore I would not hold myself
out as being able formally to advise on Libyan law. But, of course, in a
situation like this we have a problem finding someone who can advise
on Libyan law. The degree of development of Libyan law is limited.
Also I may say, in England we have another rule, which is that
unless-this rule operates in the English courts-unless a foreign law is
proved in the English courts by evidence to be different from English
law the assumption is that it is the same as English law. I mention that
only because I want to exclude any suggestion that there can be any
impropriety in an English lawyer looking at the Libyan law and forming a view on it. All that he cannot do is say to his client, I accept
responsibility for advising you formally that this is the law of Libya.
But absent any contrary advice and in the circumstances then prevailing
it was reasonable to take a view of Libyan law in this respect.
Q: But the only point I wanted to make, Mr. Lauterpacht-and please
understand, I was not suggesting any impropriety-is that you are not a
Libyan lawyer.
A: I am not.
Q: Your training basically is in common law and not in the civil code?
A: Correct.
Q: And you would not feel comfortable advising either BP or this jury on
the subtleties of Libyan law?
A: I would not feel comfortable on the subtleties of Libyan law.
Q: It is true, is it not, that, however, municipal or national court decisions
which bear on international law themselves become a part of the body
of international law which you as an international lawyer draw upon?
A: That is correct. A decision of a national court can make a contribution
to the content of customary international law. Whether it does so in any
particular case obviously depends on the intrinsic quality of the judgment. If it is a good judgment, given by a court, a judge of evident
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authority and quality, then it is a judgment which will play a part. If it
is a judgment given by a poor court, or in a slipshod manner, or without
evident consideration of all relevant factors, then its efficacy as a contribution to international law is accordingly reduced.
But my point is that a national court's pronouncement on a question of
international significance is there for you to review and to decide
whether it is entitled to weight and consideration in your mind, or not?
Certainly.
And that includes specifically pursuit actions, such as filed by BP in the
'50s and such as filed by BP and Hunt in the '70s?
One would try to take account of them, provided that, of course, they
dealt with the points of public international law.
Now, it is true, is it not, that the Italian decisions adverse to BP in the
1950s were there for your consideration and review in deciding whether
or not to file pursuit actions in Libya in the '70s?
Yes.
And, Mr. Lauterpacht, even though you had lost in the '50s in Italian
courts, you decided, did you not, to go back to the Italian courts in the
'70s?
I personally did not make that decision, but I thought it a perfectly
proper thing for BP to do, after they had consulted their Italian lawyers.
Did you disagree with their Italian lawyers?
There was no reason why I should.
And, of course, the only Italian case to reach decision regarding Concession No. 65 BP lost in the trial court, did it not?
My understanding is that it was lost in the court in Syracuse.
Did I understand you to testify that you don't know whether it was
appealed by BP, or not?
I think you understand that correctly. If there is any doubt in your
mind it reflects a doubt in my mind, which may have been reflected in
my reference to it. My impression is that if there had been an appeal
open to BP it would have been taken. The reason I do not know
whether it was taken is because I think at the time a prospect of a settlement with Libya may have intervened.
The decision was on February 15, 1973. Do you know when the prospect for settlement first arose?
I don't, because that was an in-house matter. I suppose I became aware
of the prospect of settlement very near the settlement date.
Verynear what? I'm sorry.
Very near the settlement date, which was toward the end of '74.
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Q: And you recall, do you not, sir, that what the Italian court held was that
Libyan law and Italian law were similar in that respect, and that under
that law BP never had title to the oil in strata, and therefore the nationalization did not take from BP anything which was BP's?
A: I thought that the Italian court, having said that the law of Libya was
comparable to Italian law actually held that BP didn't have title because
it didn't extract the oil. But I am open to correction. That was my
understanding. And, as I said earlier today, the Italian court never considered the question which I believed to be fundamental, namely,
whether the Libyan legislation was compatible with international law,
because, as I suggested earlier, the illegality in international law terms
of the Libyan nationalization was such as to nullify the termination of
the concession.
Q: And, of course, you were aware of the existence of the Italian court
decision when the meeting between you and Mr. Conant occurred in
London, were you not?
A: I must have been, because the decision of the Italian court was in February and the meeting with Mr. Conant was in May or June, I think.
Q: Now, Mr. Lauterpacht, much has been made of the fact here in this trial
that the Italian Court decision was but a Trial Court decision subject to
appeal, but it is true, is it not, that even in Italy the statistics, raw statistics, favor the affirmance of a lower court opinion on appeal?
A: Well, now, let me say first that, as to much being made in the trial here
of the fact that the Italian judgment was open to appeal, I don't know
about that. I'm certainly not making much of that point.
As to the part of the question relating to statistics of appeals and overrulings in Italy, that's quite outside my range of knowledge.
Q: With regard to the legal system that you are familiar with, that is, the
English system, is it not true that more cases are affirmed on appeal than
are reversed on appeal?
A: I confess I have never thought about it and I do not know the answer.
Q: At any rate, do you not agree with me that a careful lawyer, advising his
client what to do in the face of an adverse decision, even if it were subject to appeal, would probably advise his client to go slow until we see
what happens to this decision on appeal?
A: No, I do not share that view. A careful lawyer weighs up all of the
elements in the situation, and the Syracuse judgment was only one element in the situation. I think it is right to put the Syracuse judgment,
the Italian judgment, into perspective. I hope I am a careful lawyer, so
what are the sorts of things that I took into consideration in my general
view that it was reasonable to proceed with pursuit litigation? Naturally
I took into consideration the Rosemary, in England-sorry, in Aden. I
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also took into consideration the fact that in the English courts in 1956
there was a very important judgment in the High Court by Mr. Justice
Upjohn, in a case called Re Helbert Wagg. In that case Mr. Justice
Upjohn applied the same basic principle, the same approach to the law,
as was reflected in the Rosemary.
Then I took into consideration the position in other countries. Of
course, I was aware of the negative elements, in Japan and in Italy. I
was also aware of positive elements.
For example, there had been litigation in Germany and in France,
pursuit litigation, relating to Chilean copper, which had been successful.
There had been a case in the Netherlands, in which actually the
United States government was the plaintiff, against a Dutch bank, in
which the same basic issue-it was not pursuit litigation as such-the
same basic issue had been raised, and the Dutch courts had subscribed
to the basic position of principle which I have been trying to explain to
you.
I also bore in mind-to the limit that I could as a non-U.S. lawyer-I
also bore in mind the evolution of the law in the United States. I was
very conscious of the fact that pursuit litigation had got as far as the
U.S. Supreme Court, in 1962, in relation to Cuban sugar; and I was
aware also that the majority of the Supreme Court had decided that
pursuit litigation in a manner adverse to the position which I had held,
and therefore I have to explain that to you more fully.
The U.S. Supreme Court in that particular case decided-

MR. MATTHEWS: Excuse me, Mr. Lauterpacht.
Your Honor, I think the witness has gone far beyond the intent of the
question, and I would object to it as nonresponsive.
MR. REASONER: May I respond, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes sir.
MR. REASONER: I think, Your Honor, that Mr. Matthews has deliberately sought to imply that Mr. Lauterpacht was imprudent because he did
not give weight to a Trial Court decision in Italy, standing alone. It seems
to me Mr. Lauterpacht is full entitled to explain to the jury what he
weighed that against.
THE COURT: Mr. Matthews, I view this witness as an expert witness, and
I think he has a right to give the basis on which he arrived at his decisions,
which, in turn, translated into recommendations to his clients, and I'm
going to permit him to answer it.
MR. MATTHEWS: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. REASONER: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You

may answer it.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.
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A: (Continuing) I was trying to explain, in the words of Mr. Matthews, how
a careful lawyer would try to assess this overall situation, and I was
emphasizing to you that I wouldn't have allowed myself to be totally
dominated by one decision of one court in one country, reached on a
very summary basis, because we have been talking about this Syracuse
judgment as if it was a very elaborately reasoned judgment. But if I
were to be given an opportunity to show you the text of that Italian
judgment you would realize that the part of the judgment, which is
being put to me as being so important is very barely reasoned, you
know, by two pages of typewriting.
So I'm explaining other decisions as well, and I had come to the decision in the United States. There the Supreme Court had decided
against me, so how could I possibly disregard it? And the answer isthere are several elements in the answer. First of all, the decision of the
majority of the Supreme Court was qualified in certain very important
respects, which deprived that judgment of a certain internal logical consistency. In other words, although it was the judgment of the Supreme
Court, entitled to the highest respect, especially from a foreigner, it was
nonetheless a judgment which one could criticize.
Secondly, that judgment had been criticized, and very strongly and
very cogently, in the dissenting judgment of Mr. Justice White.
Thirdly, the Congress of the United States had found the judgment
unsatisfactory and had, therefore, adopted legislation for the purpose of
amending the law. The effect of the congressional legislation, as I
understand it, was to permit pursuit action in the United States.
And all of that had happened before 1972. All that combined to
influence my judgment in this matter.
I won't take you through the other points that also weighed with me,
but I think I have said enough to give you the sense of the care and
elements which went into the general view that a policy of pursuit htigation was reasonable.
Q: Time, however, has not proved you right, has it, Mr. Lauterpacht?
A: I can't answer that question without asking you, please, to elaborate by
saying in what respect I was wrong.
Q: It is true that with the exception of the Rosemary, which was back in the
'50s, we have discussed none of the pursuit actions filed by your client in
response to either the Iranian or the Libyan litigations that have been
won by your clients?
A: That, as a manner of speaking, is correct. But we must not suggest that
that is the whole answer to the question of pursuit litigation. True, in
the 1950s we failed in Japan; true, in the 1950s we failed in Italy; true, in
the 1972 decision we failed again in Italy. But that isn't the whole picture of pursuit litigation, as I just presented to you. And if the question
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is being put to me: Did time prove me wrong? Then perhaps I might be
permitted to draw your attention to another arbitration decision of
equal importance to that of Judge Lagergren's. You have been told
about the arbitration between BP and Libya arising out of the seizure of
BP, but in 1973 not only was Mr. Hunt expropriated in Libya but also
the Texas Overseas Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of the wellknown company, The Texas Oil Company. And Texas Overseas, otherwise called Topco, started arbitration proceedings in Libya very similar
to those which were started by BP. Once again, it was necessary for the
president of the International Court of Justice to appoint the arbitrator
because Libya did not appear. He chose a distinguished French international lawyer, Professor Dupuy. Now, the interesting thing about the
Dupuy award is that it is different, opposite, to the Lagergren award in
the particular respect on which Mr. Matthews is now asking me questions, because Topco asked the arbitrator for an order, and I'm afraid I
have to use the Latin word here because this is what they asked for, an
order of restitutio in integrum which, roughly transcribed, means restoration back to the original situation. What Topco was seeking from the
arbitrator was an order that they were entitled to go back to Libya, that
the concession was still in force, and had not been eradicated by the
Libyan action. And in this respect Dupuy gave an award quite the
opposite of Lagergren. Dupuy said, I'm going to order restitutio. My
order is that within five months Libya put you back in the position in
which you had been prior to the expropriation. In other words, Dupuy
rejected the suggestion that the Libyan nationalization was capable of
terminating a concession virtually identical with that of BP and Mr.
Hunt. So that, in that respect, I think time has shown me to be right on
that cardinal point.
Mr. Lauterpacht, I will call it the Texaco award since that's the name
that's familiar to me, in the Texaco award the arbitrator, Dupuy, found
that Libya had breached its concession agreement with the concessionaire, did it not?
Yes.
And he ordered, as the remedy for that breach, that Libya within five
months restore to the concessionaire the award, true?
Restore to the concessionaireThe concession?
The concession, yes.
And, of course, that was a proceeding by Texaco against the State
involved?
Yes.
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Q: It was not a proceeding like this one, or like the pursuit actions, which
are against two private parties?
A: Correct.
Q: The arbitrator in that decision did not hold that oil produced from the
date of the nationalization to the date of the decree remained in Texaco,
did it?
A: He was not asked to.
Q: And as you say, he gave Libya five months to comply with the award,
recognizing that that was somewhat of a bold step, did he not?
A: I don't know about the bold step. But the point that matters for our
purposes is that in giving them five months to restore the situation he
was recognizing the continuity of the concession and it is the continuity
of the concession that is central to this discussion about pursuit
litigation.
The reason I was suggesting to you that the Italian decision was
wrong was that the Italian decision disregarded the illegality of the Libyan nationalization. The Italian decision treated the rights of BP to oil
as dependent solely upon the proposition that the oil had to be extracted
by BP. The Italian Court rejected the notion that the concession
remained in force. Now, here was Dupuy saying that the concession
does remain in force. Now, if we were to imagine a situation, which is
not the case, but if we were to imagine a situation in which the Italian
Court had been controlled by the decision of Dupuy, the Italian Court
could not have reached the decision which it did.
Q: And is it not true that Judge Dupuy in the Texaco award, left the proceedings open and told the parties, in essence, I know that my award
may be useless so I'm going to leave the proceedings open and you can
come back for more appropriate relief if Libya does not restore the
concession?
A: I've forgotten the words in which he did it, but I think that may be the
essence of what he said.
Q: All right. Now, let me ask my question again: Is it not true in the context of a private litigant against a private litigant that the Rosemary is
the only successful piece of pursuit litigation filed by your client at your
behest or under your advice?
A: On the basis of my advice, yes.
Q: All right, sir. Now, I talked a little bit earlier in my cross examination
of you, Mr. Lauterpacht, about the two aspects of your advice to your
client, which you and I both admit are very intertwined. The first was
the subject of validity of nationalization, and the second was what we
have been talking about, and this is the legitimacy of pursuit actions. I
want to talk a little bit now about the nationalization itself. It is true, is
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it not, Mr. Lauterpacht, that nationalizations are not invalid or illegal
per se?
That depends upon the character of the relationship between the nationalizing state and the person whose property is taken.
In truth and in fact your government has nationalized and my government has nationalized?
Yes. But if I may say so in respect to that, that has nothing to do with
the answer I just gave you. What I wanted to say by way of answer to
your question is this: That where a state is simply taking the property of
a foreigner, his house, his mine, if you like, then what Mr. Matthews
said to me is correct, that nationalization by itself is not unlawful. It
becomes unlawful only if it's discriminatory or retaliatory or if it is in
particular not accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation. But the position is different where the nationalization involves the taking of a concession, where the nationalization
involves the violation of the pledged word of the taking state. In respect
to the concessions granted by Libya to BP, to Hunt, to Texaco, and to
others, they all, I believe, contain the provision to the effect that Libya
would not change the terms of the concession unilaterally, and the view
is taken by him, though not by all, the view is taken by him that a
nationalization of a concession in breach of that kind of undertaking is,
per se, illegal.
Mr. Lauterpacht, I appreciate your desire to do a good job, but I
think-

MR. REASONER: Your Honor, I would object to Mr. Matthews' gratuitous characterizations of the witness' testimony.
THE COURT: WellMR. MATTHEWS: Your HonorTHE COURT: Your concern is that his responses are broader than your
questions?
MR. MATTHEWS: My concern is that he's taking the opportunity to argue
his case in response to every question, and I ask the Court to instruct him to
answer my questions.
MR. REASONER: Your Honor, may I respond?
Mr. Matthews has asked him very argumentative legal questions. We
have not objected to characterizations of legal opinions that were clearly
couched in argumentative terms.
THE COURT: What is important here is that the evidence that's relative to
the case is presented properly before the jury. I simply say to you, Mr.
Matthews, please phrase your questions as prudently and correctly as you
can to get the answers you want.
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MR. MATrHEWS: I will try to do so.
MR. REASONER: Thank you, Your Honor.
Q: My question to you was, Mr. Lauterpacht, that a nationalization is not,
per se, illegal. There is power in the various states to nationalize?
A: And my answer is, which I tried to give, was that it is not per se illegal in
some cases, but it is per se illegal in others.
Q: And I believe in your answer you recited the factors to which historically international lawyers have looked to to determine what makes a
nationalization lawful and those are, are they not, a payment of compensation, a proper purpose, and nondiscriminatory?
A: Yes.
Q: All right, sir. It is true, is it not, that many international lawyers put
prime importance on the payment of compensation and would hold, or
would view a nationalization as effective if there is prompt and adequate payment of the compensation even absent the other two factors?
A: You will forgive me if I can't answer that question directly, though I
would like to say that there are many who will say a nationalization is
unlawful if prompt, adequate and effective compensation is not paidthat I certainly concur with. And the other two elements may not enter
into the situation at all.
Q: Let me refer you to Article 5 of Exhibit No. 3, which is the copy of the
BP nationalization decree, and see if I read this correctly. "Article
5: 'The State shall pay compensation to the party concerned for the
property rights and assets reverting it by virtue of Article 1. The determination of the amount of such compensation shall be undertaken by a
committee to be formed by a decree issued by the Minister of Petroleum
in the following manner' ":
And then it sets forth the manner in which the committee is to be
appointed, does it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And, Mr. Lauterpacht, I am not asking you why, I am simply asking
you if it is not a fact that you and your client acted immediately to send
out the warning notices, a copy of which is on the board, and again I'm
not asking you why, I'm just asking you did you?
A: Yes, it is a fact.
Q: And you did not wait to see what or how much compensation you
would get, or how long it would take to get it, and, again, I'm not asking
for your reasons, I'm simply asking for you to confirm that you didn't
wait to see?
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, may I ask for your guidance. The position
in which the question puts me is that of saying, yes, to the question and
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thereby conveying an entirely false impression. Please, may I know what I
should do?
THE COURT: Answer his question, and your own counsel will be able to
bring out matters on redirect in the event he does not go further.
THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.
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The answer is, yes.
Now, you do know that BP settled with the Libyans, do you not?
I do.
Did you have a hand in drawing or negotiating the settlement, Mr.
Lauterpacht?
No.
You do know, do you not, that in connection with the settlement agreement, and I will put a copy of it in front of you so you can review it if
necessary, you do know that in connection with the settlement agreement the Libyans took the position that all the money they owed was
the value of assets above the ground exclusive of the value of any oil?
I do not know that from direct knowledge. I have heard it.
And you have been told that the compensation which your client
accepted was based on the value of fixed assets exclusive of the value of
any oil in the ground?
No, that I do not know. If I may explain my knowledge: It is reflected
in the note which I attached to the text of the BP award as I published it
in the InternationalLaw Reports. And in the footnote to the text of the
award I included the text of the public announcement made by BP at
the time. My recollection of that announcement, and it may be wrong,
is that it was phrased in rather general terms-after a balancing of the
claims of the two sides they reached a certain settlement.
And you know, do you not, that in connection with the settlement BP
agreed in its settlement agreement to dismiss all pursuit actions against
third parties that it was at that time engaged in?
Yes.
You described international law a little bit for the jury, but I want to go
back up a little bit and talk a little bit more about the nature of international law. It is true that except for treaties that may exist between
countries there is no book labeled "international law" that sets forth
rules that govern the conduct of nations among themselves and which is
signed by all of the nations of this earth?
There is no such codification of customary international law.
And you would describe international law as customary, would you
not?
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A: I would describe international law as including two parts: one part treaties, and the other part customary.
Q: And what you mean by customary law is, looking at history and at current events at the same time, what will the various nations allow to go
on among themselves without going to war; that's fairly simply stated,
but that basically is what customary international law is, is it not?
A: With respect, I would not subscribe to any such simplification of the
description. I think one can describe international law in simple terms
but without putting it in such broad terms. And I have said it earlier
and I will say it again in slightly more accommodating words, customary international law is a reflection of what states are deemed tacitly to
agree to. In other words, customary international law is that body of
rules which I can derive from the conduct of states. To use words like
past history, current international regulations, going to war, are not
really part of the picture at all. Unless by history you mean what states
have done in a legal context, and unless you mean by international regulations what that current practice in a legal context is. And as for
going to war, that's got nothing to do with it at all.
Q: All right. It is looking at what has gone on and attempting to predict
what the states will permit to go on among themselves in the future, is
that a fair characterization of what you have just said?
A: The first part, yes. The second part, no. Because one's not concerned
with trying to identify what they will permit to go on between them in
the future. What one is concerned with is identifying a body of rules
that derives from past practice. It is not part of your task to judge
whether it's going to be acceptable in the future. The important thing is
to identify whether it's part of the practice of the states at the material
date.
Q: And it's true, is it not, Mr. Lauterpacht, that while both your government and mine sent notes of protest to the Libyan government no warwe never even got close to war in connection with the nationalizations,
that's a fair statement, is it not?
A: It's a correct statement.
MR. MATTHEWS: Pass the witness, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Reasoner.
MR. REASONER: Thank you, Your Honor, I would like to ask a few
questions.
Redirect Examination by Mr. Reasoner
Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, Mr. Matthews suggested that if BP and the Hunts
were really sincere about their pursuit litigation they would sit back,
watch people buy the oil without notice and then leap upon them, or
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pounce upon them. Do you recall the questions that I'm referring to in
general? I want to direct your attention back to that. If BP and the
Hunts sat back, watched someone buy hot Libyan oil without warning
them, then sued them, would they take the risk that that purchaser
would be able to persuade a court that he was either an innocent purchaser for value and therefore had superior title, or in the alternative,
that BP and the Hunts had unclean hands because they had watched the
purchase without warning him and therefore were not entitled to any
equitable relief?
Those possibilities would exist, but basically the reason for issuing the
warning notices is, as I say, to ensure that there would be no plea of
innocence by a purchaser. And also because it is the fair thing to do.
If you relied merely on advertisements published in papers, and did not
directly warn those customers that you had knowledge--or potential
customers-that you had knowledge they might be dealing in the hot
Libyan oil, wouldn't it always be the risk that the customer would be
able to successfully claim that they had not seen your advertisements?
That risk would exist.
Mr. Matthews referred-it seems to me, if I followed his question, he
was asking you about other private pursuit litigation, but he was trying
to limit it to pursuit litigation where you had been involved, advising
BP. Has there been any other private pursuit litigation between private
parties where the companies whose assets were illegally expropriated
has prevailed in a pursuit litigation?
As I stated in my reply to Mr. Matthews' question, there has been such
litigation in relation to Chilean copper, and the original owner was successful in actions in both Germany and in France.
Was there also successful pursuit litigation involving Singapore oil
stock?
Yes, there was. I forgot to mention that, because, in a sense, it isn't
pursuit litigation exactly parallel with the kind of proceedings which we
are discussing now. As you asked me about it, I better explain what the
Singapore oil stocks litigation was about.
Let me interrupt you one moment here. When I say-I believe the cases
are referred to as oil stocks, but, by oil stocks, we don't mean like shares
of stock in a company, I take it this would be oil in tanks?
This was stocks, accumulations of oil and products.
Thank you.
And this was a case which occurred after the close of the second world
war. During the second world war the Japanese occupied what were
then the Islands of the Netherlands East Indies, islands in which two
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companies, Shell and Socony Vacuum had the concessions to look for
and extract oil.
During the period of the Japanese occupation they extracted crude
oil, they refined it in the refineries in the Indies, and then they took it
away and used it. At the end of the war large stocks of this oil and
products were found in Singapore by the British forces when they took
possession of the islands, and the British government took those stocks,
saying, these are booty of war. Booty of war is the description given to
property of your enemy which you capture, and to which you obtain
good title if it is the property of the enemy. But Shell and Socony said
no, that's not Japanese property at all. That's our property, because it
came from the area of our wells and our exclusive -concession rights,
and, therefore, although the Japanese may have extracted it, only we
could acquire title to it.
The matter went to the courts in Singapore. The court of first
instance held against Shell and Socony, and then it went to the Court of
Appeals, where the Court of Appeals held in favor of Shell and Socony.
So therefore you have a kind of pursuit litigation, where the oil companies are saying to the British government, that oil came from an area
which was ours; it therefore belongs to us; the government is saying
otherwise; the matter goes to the courts; and the courts uphold the claim
of the original concession owner.
Q: Is it fair to say, Mr. Lauterpacht, that international law, as does the
common law of England and the United States, evolves over time?
A: Yes.
Q: Would you say that international law is evolving towards permitting the
owners of foreign concessions which are illegally expropriated greater
protection?
MR. MATTHEWS: Your Honor, I object to that. The issue in this case is
not what international law is evolving toward, but the state of mind of this
man's client in 1973.
MR. REASONER: May I respond?
THE COURT: No. I'll overrule the objection, I want to hear it.
You may answer.
A: The question put to me was is international law envolving in a direction
favorable to pursuit litigation. Part of the answer I have already given,
because I have described to you the elements that went into my advice
in 1972. So that, to complete the answer, I have only got to describe to
you one or two episodes that have happened since 1972, to confirm the
general direction in which it is moving. And perhaps the two items that
best deserve mentioning in this court are both items that happened here
in the United States.
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One is that there has been another decision of the Supreme Court, in
a case which we call Dunhill, for short, and I can be reminded of the
exact title of it, but the so-called Dunhill case also related to Cuban
expropriation, but this time in relation to Cuban tobacco. And there the
U.S. Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice White, whom you remember
was the dissenter in the Sabbaino case in 1962, there the United States
Supreme Court took a much more flexible view of the position and
reduced the scope of the so-called Act to State Doctrine, which is the
doctrine that runs against pursuit litigation. They reduced the scope of
the Act of State Doctrine considerably. That's one item.
A second item is the fact that the State Department itself, in official
correspondence with the courts in these pursuit actions, has also moved
away from the Act of State Doctrine, i.e., away from the prohibition of
pursuit litigation.
And the third item is that, in the last Congress, in 1980, Congressman
Mathison actually introduced legislation for the purpose of reducing
even further the scope of Act of State Doctrine.

Q: Thank you, Mr. Lauterpacht. Let me get you to look at Defendants'
Exhibit 3, which was the text of the Libyan nationalization law of 1971.
You recall Mr. Matthews asked you whether BP sent out warning
notices immediately, and whether BP didn't wait to see what the Libyans were going to do. But he went to great pains to make clear to you
he didn't want to know why BP had done it. I want you to tell the jury
why you sent out notices immediately and why you did not wait?
A: The members of the jury will remember that this was the question in
relation to which I expressed a difficulty. I answered Mr. Matthews'
question directly and said if I directly answered it in the way I did I
gave a mistaken impression of the true situation.
Why was that? Because the question that was put to me was exclusively in terms of compensation. In other words, although there are at
least three grounds on which a nationalization may be unlawful, i.e.,
one, because it is for the wrong purpose; two, because it is discriminatory; three, because it is not accompanied by the payment of prompt,
adequate and effective compensation.
I was asked the question about only one of those grounds, and the
implication was that if I said that BP had started its actions, its warning
letters, before the question of compensation had been considered I was
really supporting the view that BP was reacting to the Libyan nationalization before it could be said to be illegal.
Now, my problem was that the Libyan nationalization was unlawful
for other reasons as well. The Libyan nationalization was unlawful for
two other reasons: One was that it was brought about for reasons quite
unconnected with the internal economy of Libya. What had happened
was that, just before the Libyan nationalization of BP, in December
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1971, Great Britain was in the process of completing its withdrawal
from east of Suez. You remember Great Britain had considerable interests east of Suez, and then as part of its overall policy the British government was withdrawing from east of Suez. That withdrawal of British
power involved termination of arrangements between Great Britain and
the small principalities in the Persian Gulf, the sheikdoms of Dubai,
Sharjah, and so on. These are sheikdoms which had been under British
protection and Great Britain was pulling out.
In the Persian Gulf there are some islands. One is called the Greater
Tumb, another the Lesser Tumb, the third, Abu Musa. Iran laid claim
to those islands. With Britain withdrawing, Iran made good its claim to
Greater and Lesser Tumb by actually occupying them, and Great Britain, being almost at the end of the period of protection, did nothing
about it. And it was this that sparked off the Libyan reaction, because
Colonel Qadhafi took the view that these were Arab islands, that they
should have been protected from Iranian occupation.
And so he said, "I am going to retaliate against British interests in
Libya and I'm going to take away the property of BP."
So that was a nationalization that had nothing to do with the internal
economy of Libya. It was a nationalization motivated by external political considerations.
The suggestion that nationalization is per se legal, which was put to
me, is valid in certain situations, but not where the nationalization is
unconnected with the internal interest of the country, and where it is for
an external, political purpose.
That was the first reason why the nationalization was unlawful. And
the second reason was that, having regard to what I have just told you, it
was also clearly discriminatory. This wasn't a nationalization in which
Libya was trying to take all the oil properties and subject them to Libyan control, British, American and others. It was just going for the British. So it was discriminatory, and for that reason unlawful.
So it is necessary for me to qualify my answer in that way, by saying
no, it wasn't simply a question of compensation; it was illegality due to
these other factors.
Having said that, I can come back to the question of compensation.
The rule of international law is-if you leave aside the political motivation, leave aside the element of discrimination-the rule of international
law is that the nationalization, to be lawful, must be accompanied byaccompanied by, I stress that-must be accompanied by prompt, adequate and effective compensation; and each of those words means something. Prompt means prompt, adequate means enough or full, and
effective means compensation that you can take away in your pocket
and which is not locked up in the currency of the taking state.
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All of those elements have to be satisfied before the offer of compensation is effective to endow a nationalization with legality.
None of that, none of that was in the. Libyan nationalization. The
passage which was read to you was a passage which stated that the state
shall pay compensation, not prompt, adequate and effective compensation, but compensation, with no indication of how much, no guarantee
that the compensation would be measured by the right standard, or that
it would be measured fairly.
And that's not the end of the story. The point is that there was a
concession, and the concession itself contained provisions for disputes
between the parties. It was not appropriate for the Libyans to say we
are going to pull the question of compensation right out of our settlement provision, we are going to have compensation determined by this
board of three people, who are nominated by ourselves. If compensation with respect to the nationalization was to be fairly assessed, it had
to be assessed by reference to the arbitration provisions.
All of those factors were immediately obvious. One didn't have to
wait around. And that's why the company acted straightaway, as it did.
Mr. Lauterpacht, let me ask you just briefly-it is true, is it not, that,
based on the facts known to you, one could have-or that you did similarly conclude that-the nationalization of the Hunts' interest was illegal because, based on the political considerations, it was discriminatory,
had the same flaws with regard to compensation?
I must, of course, state that I never looked at the Hunt nationalization as
closely as I did the BP nationalization, because that wasn't my job, but
on the reading of the facts at that time it seemed to me to be a highly
comparable situation.
Have you told the jury your completely honest and unbiased view,
unaffected by the amount of the fee that we have paid you?
Indeed I have. I have taken pains to take the jury through a history of
my life, in a sense, in relation to this principle. I have told you about
the way my thinking evolved from my earliest stage in practice. I'm
very committed in my intellectual formation to the observance of international law. When I was asked my profession I told you I was an
international lawyer. I didn't tell you I was a university teacher or a
practitioner of law. I told you I am an international lawyer. That's my
subject, and I have a deep commitment to it, because I think it matters
enormously in the promotion of international peace and security.
And so when I take a position on principle it's because I feel it very
deeply, and I feel it particularly deeply in relation to this matter. This
principle is central and fundamental. The principle is based on the
proposition that you cannot have rights arise out of wrongful acts, and if
I say that and stick to it it's not on account of the money.
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MR. REASONER: We have no further questions.
THE COURT: Mr. Matthews.
MR. MATTHEWS: I have one further question, Your Honor.

Recross Examination by Mr. Matthews
Q: Mr. Lauterpacht, I heard, and I believe I understand, your explanation
for BP's very quick reaction to the nationalization, and it was because,
as I understand it, not only were you not satisfied with the promise of
compensation that is in the nationalization decree, but also the other
two factors involved in view were vital. The only question I have got
for you, sir, is, it is true, is it not, that when BP got its money it dismissed its pursuit action?
A: Yes.
MR. MATTHEWS: No further questions, Your Honor.

